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1 Introduction
In the last decade, Zimbabwe has suffered the
consequences of economic and political turmoil.
This had a dramatic effect on the seed system,
reducing supply of quality seeds, and undermining
regulatory control. Furthermore, the radical land
reform following 2000 has reconfigured
Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. In the place of
6,000 large-scale commercial farms around
168,000 households have been resettled on small
and medium scale farms on over 7m ha, as part of
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Moyo
2011; Scoones et al. 2010). This has had some
significant effects on seed supply and demand
patterns.
Over much of the past decade, the Zimbabwean
government and donor organisations have
implemented agricultural input support
programmes which bypassed the previously
vibrant market chain. This is composed of private
suppliers (seed houses and fertiliser
manufacturers), wholesalers and rural agro-
dealers. This article argues that these ‘seed relief ’
programmes contributed to the collapse of the agro-
input supply chain, hence contributing to declining
agricultural productivity in Zimbabwe today.
In the past, the large-scale commercial farming
sector dominated both seed production and
demand, especially for high-quality hybrid maize
seed. The once vibrant private seed sector relied
on this sector for its business operations. Today, a
new scenario has emerged and is faced with
many challenges. With a substantial expansion
in the number of farmers and an extension of
cropped area into once underutilised large-scale
commercial farms, a new demand for cereal seed
has emerged. This article asks how Zimbabwe
can rebuild a seed system appropriate to the
post-land reform context, asking in particular,
questions about the underlying political economy
of this process. The article highlights the
importance of political-economic factors in
creating distorting incentives, rent-seeking
opportunities, patronage and market power in
the context of ‘real markets’, which are deeply
affected by politics, not just the economics of
demand and supply.
2 Rebuilding seed systems
Local seed production had to be rapidly
transformed following land reform. This entailed
setting up a new network of seed producers on
small-scale plots. This has increased costs of
supervision and quality control, although an
effective system is emerging. By the 2010 season,
Seed Co. had 170 growers, down from 400 when
the industry was doing well and Pioneer had 40
growers down from close to 150 when the industry
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was doing well.1 For a number of the years prior to
2010, seed production was depressed (Table 1),
and as result, a large amount of seed had to be
imported. For example, in 2009, between 15,000
and 20,000 tonnes of maize seed was imported
through formal channels, while a substantial
additional amount was imported illegally across
borders (Sperling et al. 2009). Following economic
stabilisation from 2009, maize seed production
rebounded and it currently exceeds national
requirements of around 40,000 tonnes.
Another effect of the economic decline over the
last decade or more has been the collapse in the
seed delivery system that had evolved in previous
decades. This was based on a large network of
agro-dealers, the village retailers who sell seeds,
fertilisers and farm tools, which private
companies are linked to. This network was highly
effective in delivering quality seed at competitive
prices to often remote rural areas. In 2000, 374
wholesalers and 2,057 agro-dealers were
registered with the Seed Services. By 2010, less
than 100 wholesalers and only 300 agro-dealers
were registered, with most linked to large
supermarkets and other larger retailers, and the
majority located in urban centres rather than
rural areas. A combination of hyperinflation, the
operation of a cash economy and arbitrary price
controls imposed by government and enforced by
the security services meant that many businesses
collapsed. They have not yet revived and, as
highlighted later, elements of the current
‘recovery’ programme are undermining this
further.
During the period 2005–2009, most farmers
relied on informal seed systems. This involved a
growth in seed saving, and a significant decline
in the use and yearly purchasing of hybrid seed.
Seed reuse, and particularly the growth in open
pollinated varieties (OPV) of maize seed, has
been significant. Over this period, the over 90
per cent adoption rate of hybrid maize in the
smallholder sector declined to 80 per cent, with a
growth in OPV seed use increasing to 30 per cent
of the area planted to sorghum, and 27 per cent
of the area planted to pearl millet in Zimbabwe
(Sperling et al. 2009). In addition, there has been
a growth in demand for sorghum and millet
seeds, mostly supplied through informal systems.
Informal systems have extended to largely illegal
imports of seeds of variable quality from South
Africa (Sperling et al. 2009; Langyintuo et al.
2008; Mano 2006).
Today, there are new farmers with new demands,
combined with a new supply environment based
on a restructured private sector. How should
policy respond to this situation? What is the most
effective route to recovery? The following
sections explore the policy responses, both by
government and donors/NGOs. Much of this has
been framed as an ‘emergency’, ‘humanitarian’
response, where seed ‘relief ’ is considered as
part of ‘social protection’ programmes which aim
at providing immediate relief, but also the
prospect of longer-term recovery. The following
sections explore the experience.
3 The politics of seed relief programmes
Over the last decade, the government has been a
major player in the provision of agricultural
inputs, partly as a drought response initiative
and also partly to buttress the Fast Track Land
Reform Programme (FTLRP) (Rohrbach et al.
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Table 1 Maize seed production trends
Season Seed produced/sales (tonnes)
2002/03 45,000
2003/04 22,000
2006/07 43,000
2007/08 50,000
2008/09 32,000
2009/10 22,672
2010/11 55,263
Source: Mutonodzo-Davies (2010)
2004; Govere et al. 2009; Hanyani-Mlambo and
Hobane 2010).
A whole plethora of schemes have been
implemented, mainly through parastatals such
as the Grain Marketing Board and District
Development Fund (DDF). In some instances,
the crop inputs would be provided free of charge
and in other cases, they were heavily subsidised.
In 2004, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)
became a major financier of agricultural
programmes through the launching of the
Productive Sector Facility (PSF) and later the
Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement
Facility (ASPEF), both agricultural input support
schemes aimed at cushioning farmers against
the high input prices caused by massive inflation
rates. In 2005, the government launched
Operation Maguta/Inala, a military-led
programme supporting farmers with tillage,
seeds and fertilisers, with mechanisation a
strong pillar. For the 2008/09 season, a successor
programme, the Champion Farmer Programme,
targeted farmers capable of achieving high
yields. During the 2009/10 season, the
government implemented a subsidised
agricultural input scheme through GMB.
Farmers could buy a 10kg pack of maize seed at
US$5 against an open market price of US$20 and
a 50kg bag of fertiliser at US$7 against an open
market price of US$28. Also in 2009/10 the
government implemented the Presidential Well-
Wishers Programme which provided input packs
comprising maize or sorghum or finger millet
and bean seed, together with basal fertiliser. A
common feature of all government programmes
was that inputs were acquired in bulk from local
or international input suppliers for distribution
through the GMB network of depots, largely
bypassing the normal agricultural input
distribution chain which involves wholesalers and
agro-dealers.
This was also a feature of most NGO schemes
supported by donors. Table 2 gives a breakdown
of the number of households provided with free
or heavily subsidised inputs since the 2003/04
cropping season, by NGOs. The proportion of all
smallholder farming households supported
ranged from 65 per cent in 2003/04 to about
15 per cent in 2007/08. The average contribution
to the maize area planted over the years was
7 per cent.
NGOs mainly distributed open pollinated maize
varieties (OPV) and small grains after 2003/04.
In an effort to capture the lucrative NGO
market, most seed companies started producing
OPV maize seed. According to the seed situation
report by the Zimbabwe Seed Traders
Association, 10 of the 11 companies which
produced seed in 2010 produced some OPV
maize seed.2 The dominant strategy used to
deliver inputs to beneficiary households during
this period was direct distribution. NGOs
centrally procured inputs mainly directly from
seed or fertiliser companies, again undermining
rural agro-dealers.
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Table 2 Proportion of households and quantity of inputs distributed by NGOs 2004–2010
Year Households supported (%) Cereal seed (tonnes) Fertilisers
Maize Small grains
OPV Hybrid
2003/04 65 3,304 3,061 2,835 7,737
2004/05 28 1,972 291 847 5,828
2005/06 24 1,605 31 771 8,626
2006/07 21 696 175 981 9,049
2007/08 15 307 138 1,119 8,598
2008/09 20 1,282 54 939 15,509
2009/10 48 5,877 641 1,157 51,356
Source: FAO Database (2010)
However, in the last season, when seed
production rebounded, not all seed was being
absorbed by relief programmes. The average
maize area planted has been around 1.6m ha,
giving a seed requirement of 40,000 tonnes.
There has thus been no ‘seed supply gap’, and
seed houses once again attempted to revitalise
connections via rural agro-dealers. But such
businesses had to compete with directly
distributed ‘relief seed’. Recognising this
problem, a number of market-based inputs have
emerged, particularly following the stabilisation
of the economy from 2009. These include:
z Providing farmers with inputs on credit with
the farmers delivering a portion of their
produce equivalent to input support provided
z Seed fairs, where vouchers provided by NGOs
to vulnerable members of the community
were exchanged for inputs supplied by
commercial and informal traders and
z Vouchers redeemable for inputs through rural
agro-dealers.
4 Seed relief: experiences from the ground
In order to explore how seed relief programmes
played out in reality during 2010/11, four case
study sites were chosen (Figure 1): two in high
potential areas (in the north) and the other two
in low potential areas (in the south).
The research involved reviewing secondary
information, discussions with a cross-section of
stakeholders, NGOs, donors, input suppliers,
agro-dealers, wholesalers, government officials,
attending meetings organised by the various
implementing agencies and field visits. The
study was complemented by analysis of
household data on sources and quantities of
inputs collected from 527 households from the
four case study sites.3
Across the sites, different mechanisms were
used. The low potential sites were dominated by
direct distribution or commodity-based vouchers,
while the higher potential sites had exposure to
market-oriented approaches supported by NGOs.
The distribution approaches employed in high
potential areas meant that farmers had a choice
on which inputs to purchase, whereas in low
potential areas, government and NGO
technocrats determined what inputs were ideal
beneficiaries. For example, in Goromonzi, a total
of 10,000 communal households received
vouchers redeemable at local agro-dealers, of
which 9,000 received paper-based vouchers and
1,000 households received electronically-
redeemable vouchers. In Gokwe South, another
high potential area, 20,366 households received
vouchers from NGOs, with only 5,000 households
receiving direct support via NGOs.
In some sites, there was a flood of initiatives. For
example in Chivi, around 17,000 households were
supported by NGOs and 16,000 households by
government, some receiving support from both.
Most received support through commodity-based
voucher schemes, although there are some who
received direct support. NGOs were not
interested in distributing agricultural inputs in
Beitbridge, which is predominantly extremely dry.
In 2010/11, and for the first time in many years,
agro-dealers played a role delivering agricultural
inputs. Around 55.8 per cent of the households
engaged the market to access inputs (seed or
fertiliser) (Table 3). Suprisingly, the greatest
proportion of households which purchased inputs
was found in the low potential area of Chivi, but
this can partly be explained by the fact that aid
agencies distributed seed (sorghum and legumes)
which is not preferred by farmers, hence farmers
engaged the market to buy maize seed.
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Table 3 Proportion of smallholder households which accessed inputs by source
District Purchases (%) NGO (%) Government (%) NGO or Government (%)
Beitbridge 38.3 41.1 41.1
Chivi 64.2 47.5 22.5 58.3
Gokwe South 62.7 28.7 57.3 74.0
Goromonzi 54.7 60.7 28.0 74.0
Overall 55.8 36.4 37.8 64.0
Source: 1st Round Crop Assessment (2011)
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Table 4 Experiences of seed relief programmes
Programmes Intended objectives Unintended consequences
Government Social Assistance z Inputs are provided to vulnerable zPartisan beneficiary selection. 
Scheme (free) – 10kg of maize/5kg communal households without Untimely distribution of inputs
of sorghum seed, 50kg of excess labour for public works zDistortion of input markets. 
Compound D and 50kg AN zAppropriate varieties are distributed Leakages and rent-seeking
fertiliser due to technical expertise at the zCreate dependency on free inputs
government’s disposal
zBenefit the most vulnerable 
smallholder farmers
Government Subsidised Input zBenefit transitory poor farmers zUntimely distribution of inputs. 
Programme – 10kg of maize/5kg who, because of the structural Distortion of input markets
of sorghum seed (US$5), 50kg of changes in the economy, could zLeakages and rent-seeking
Compound D and AN fertiliser not afford to buy inputs zDifficult to target
each (US$15) zReduce dependency syndrome
Value Based Voucher Input zProvide inputs in a transparent and zExpose farmers to supply failures and 
Scheme – either US$60: 10kg of non-partisan manner to vulnerable prone to price fluctuations
maize seed, 50kg of fertiliser (AN households in communal areas zDisadvantage those engaging the 
or Compound D) or US$70: 10kg zGrowth-oriented social protection market on a cash basis
of OPV maize seed, 50kg of mechanism zProne to corruption and diversion, 
Compound D and 50kg AN zCost-efficient – distributing vouchers e.g. trader provides partial allotments 
fertiliser is likely to be cheaper than or asks for bribes
commodity-based alternatives zAttractive to everyone, therefore 
because transport and logistics costs difficult to target
are lower z Inflationary risk resulting in 
zChoice – farmers decide on what to beneficiaries getting less for the 
buy, therefore they access preferred voucher and non-beneficiaries getting 
input types if there is competition worse
zResuscitate the agro input value 
chain
zBeneficial knock-on effect in the 
economy
Commodity-based Vouchers z Inputs are provided in a transparent zLate distribution of inputs – lack of
and non-partisan manner to incentive for suppliers to deliver inputs 
vulnerable communal households timely because they will have banked 
zGrowth-based social protection the cash
zMinimise the disruption of the zUndermine farmers’ preferences 
markets resulting in provision of inputs which 
zFarmers are provided with are not used by farmers
appropriate inputs
zContribute to the resuscitation of
the agro input value chain
zFarmers are guaranteed to receive 
a certain input pack
Contributory Electronic Voucher zProvide inputs in a transparent and zUntimely distribution of inputs. 
Input Scheme non-partisan manner to transitory, Distortion of input markets
poor farmers who are able-bodied zBenefit the unintended beneficiary 
and able to benefit from input group
assistance
zMinimise the disruption of the 
markets
zLimit corruption
zReduce dependency syndrome
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Table 4 Experiences of seed relief programmes (cont.)
Programmes Intended objectives Unintended consequences
Aid agencies direct input zProvide inputs to vulnerable zPoor quality inputs due to lack of due 
programme: communal households in areas diligence and limited expertise of
z5kg sorghum, 5kg groundnuts where market based supply is weak. NGOs
3kg cowpeas, 2kg millet, zGood quality agricultural inputs zUntimely delivery of inputs due to 
12.5kg AN and z Inputs are provided in a transparent lack of urgency by the private sector
12.5kg Compound D and non partisan manner companies
z50kg AN+10kg Maize+ zFarmers are guaranteed to receive zDependency relations with NGOs 
25kg Basal, 3kg cowpeas a certain input pack developed, including opportunities for
z50kg AN, 25kg basal, local patronage
5kg sorghum, 10kg G/Nuts
Presidential Well-Wishers Input zSupport vulnerable smallholder zPartisan beneficiary selection. 
Support Programme – highly fluid, farmers Untimely distribution of inputs
but commonly 10kg of maize/5kg 
of sorghum seed, 50kg of
Compound D and 50kg AN fertiliser
Figure 1 Zimbabwe: location of study sites
Source Author's original based on map from Surveyor General of Zimbabwe
Goromonzi
Gokwe South
Chivi
Beitbridge
Nationally, the total number of smallholder
farmers which were earmarked to receive
support during the 2010/11 season was 1,552,643;
enough to cover all such farmers in Zimbabwe.
Table 4 offers a qualitative overview of the key
programmes, based on the fieldwork in four
sites, exploring both the intended objectives and
unintended consequences.
Despite the high-sounding objectives stated for
all programmes, the practice on the ground was
inevitably very different. In resource-constrained
settings, subsidy programmes, no matter what
design, become objects of political contestation.
This is played out at the local level between
implementing agencies and local political actors.
The government programmes used local
authority structures and government agencies to
manage the activities, resulting in political
capture by some local players. Despite the
rhetoric of community participation and social
protection, the NGO programmes often suffered
a similar fate, with manipulation of
‘participatory’ beneficiary selection processes
and diversion of resources, 18.5 per cent of the
households, which received support in Chivi,
Gokwe South and Goromonzi gained access to
inputs from both the government and NGOs.
NGOs also added other levels of distortion, by
adding conditionalities to their programmes.
Most prevalent was the requirement that those
receiving support should pursue ‘conservation
agriculture’, a highly labour intensive practice
involving digging planting pits. This was
resented by many, and often resisted. In
Goromonzi, 30 per cent of those receiving inputs
did not dig holes, despite this being a
requirement. Local manipulation of the process
by community leaders resulted in some being ‘let
off ’ digging, while some were required, especially
in areas where NGO workers were likely to visit,
such as beside roads and business centres.
In Chivi, farmers complained vociferously about
the NGO schemes. Farmers said they preferred
maize to sorghum seed, and as a result some
farmers did not even plant the sorghum seed
provided. The germination rates of the
groundnut seed provided was as low as 5 per cent
according to extension officers. Farmers
expressed concerns about the quality of inputs
distributed through NGO programmes: ‘Why do
NGOs experiment with our lives? Do you know
that in agriculture if you miss the season that
spells hunger for the family?’ The farmers
wanted to know why: ‘Donors buy inputs from
indigenous business people when there are tried
and tested seed companies in the country’.
Farmers complained: ‘inputs were also
distributed late since private sector companies
did not have an incentive to deliver inputs
quickly because had already banked the cheque’.
Value-based vouchers programmes proved the
most flexible, and avoided some of these
problems. In Gokwe South, the dominant
commodity purchased was maize seed followed
by knapsack sprayers and cotton chemicals.4 In
Goromonzi, fertilisers were the product of choice
among beneficiaries, with AN fertiliser being the
most popular.5 ‘Beneficiaries did not consider
vouchers as cash, therefore when preferred
varieties were not available they bought any
product on offer’, remarked one agro-dealer.
Beneficiaries were keen to redeem the vouchers
as soon as possible for fear of forfeiting the
vouchers. In both sites, value-based vouchers
were distributed on time and farmers were able
to access inputs before the onset of the season, a
significant benefit by contrast to the direct
distribution schemes, especially from
government. However, the electronic scheme
experimented with in Goromonzi was widely
criticised. The electronic vouchers were printed
on scratch cards with pin codes linked to a
central database containing beneficiary details.
A beneficiary presented the voucher to an agro-
dealer who in turn sent a message to the central
database through a mobile phone for
authentication. Once authenticated, the farmer
was allowed to proceed with purchase. This
system was considered cumbersome by both
farmers and agro-dealers. Due to poor network
connectivity, most of the vouchers had to be
redeemed manually, therefore taking away all
the benefits which this system had. As one agro-
dealer wondered: ‘Why was this system even
tried in areas where there was no network at all!’
What impacts did these schemes have on agro-
dealers, supposedly the centre of the ‘new green
revolution’? Some were happy to have made some
money from the programmes, however the
general perception was that benefits were skewed
heavily in favour of wholesalers who set up large
networks of small-scale, often unlicensed agro-
dealers to deliver supply materials purchased by
NGOs. But many such businesses failed once the
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programmes stopped, and many made a loss on
the agricultural inputs, as profits were captured
higher up the chain. Some of the wholesalers who
participated in the open voucher programme had
the luxury of having some of their risks
underwritten by an insurance scheme paid for by
donors. The value-based voucher programme, for
example, was implemented on the back of a
Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Program (RARP),
which was coordinated by SNV.
What then is the underlying politics of these seed
relief schemes? Different forms of patronage
have emerged. Because the positioning of actors
and their configuration is highly political, so are
the programmes that evolve. This means that
targeting, defined by who wins, who loses and
where seed goes, has its own political economy.
Narratives shift, depending on the wider political-
economic context, on the actors and on the time.
For example, 2005–06 witnessed the Maguta
response to food insecurity; 2007–08 saw the
Champion Farmers being targeted (the viable)
and post-2009, both government and
donors/NGOs competed in ‘humanitarian’ and
‘relief ’ programmes. There has been much
confusion around whether the schemes are for
the vulnerable, poor and needy or for the viable,
most productive who have potential, or even for
those who are in line with particular politics.
There is also questioning around which areas are
being targeted, whether old or new resettlements,
communal land, or small-scale commercial farms.
What is intriguing about these initiatives by very
different actors with very different politics is that
the broad justificatory narrative is the same. All
promote input-support based on the assumptions
of scarcity and the failure of alternative seed
systems. Most rely on a top-down approach for
delivery and a fairly blunt approach to targeting.
And with few exceptions, the programmes are
also highly prone to rent-seeking/corruption, and
inevitably link and identify with local politics and
patronage systems, whether blatant support to
particular party supporters or favouritism of
‘communities’ in NGO programming.
Furthermore, initiatives have a tendency not to
procure seed locally, even in cases where seed is
available at local level, and so are locked into
business relationships with seed companies.
The programmes are thus allied to particular
private sector interests who are very happy to be
the beneficiaries of large subsidy programmes
which have been referred to as ‘fat cheques’. The
private sector receives these without the hassles of
dealing with numerous small farmers who buy
small quantities, or the increased risk of
transporting seed to remote areas where it is not
bought. Private sector companies admitted that,
‘… administratively it’s easier to deal with a few
big customers than numerous small ones, although
it tends to distort the market by removing the
competitiveness of local seed sellers or agro-
dealers’. Agro-dealers on the other hand
bemoaned the lack of business as a result of the
huge government and donor programmes: ‘We
have been out of business for a long time now and
have had to diversify into other products which are
not agricultural because there is no space to
operate. Although this season was better we
managed to stock and make money with seeds, but
as you can see fertilisers did not move as farmers
were getting these cheap from GMB and NGOs’.
The result of these initiatives is seed companies
neglecting their network of rural stockists and
customers while donors and government are
crowding out agro-dealers at the local level.
5 Alternatives?
Who has been excluded by this narrative that
has so dominated thinking in recent years
centred on subsidised seed supply, assumed to be
filling a ‘seed supply gap’? Our research has
identified two alternative narratives which have
often been silenced by the dominance of the
government and donor push – one focused on the
private sector and market-centred formal seed
systems and the other focused on farmers and
informal, local-level seed systems. These are
discussed in turn in this section.
Has recent policy undermined the capacity of the
private sector both to produce quality seed and
deliver it? There are many actors within the
private sector, including large and small
companies and agro-dealers. As discussed, some
of these actors have benefited from large
government or donor contracts, while others
have lost out. An alternative narrative emerges
from this group, that rebuilding the seed system
requires rebuilding the private sector, but re-
geared to a new pattern of demand with the
right product in the right places for the farmer
of today. It is not so much a question of supplying
more seed, but rebuilding the formal and
informal systems) for the long term.
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Actors in aid agencies, government and the seed
industry are split on this alternative view. While
most agree that rebuilding the seed industry is
vital, the pressures to maintain an emergency
approach are intense. For the aid agencies,
emergency/humanitarian funding is largely the
only source of funding in Zimbabwe given the
ongoing political conflicts and ‘restrictive
measures’. For government, an emergency
footing again suits a delivery mode which is top
down and directed at immediate production
targets rather than longer-term development.
For the seed industry, the ‘fat cheques’ and
guaranteed markets are highly beneficial. Yet in
the last two seasons, market-friendly approaches
have become more common, and some important
experimentation, as discussed above, has emerged.
Another alternative narrative emerges from this
analysis. Rebuilding the seed system so that it is
able to respond to new opportunities following
land reform requires rebuilding the farmer-
based seed system from the bottom-up. In recent
times, there has been a remarkable resilience of
local seed systems, despite the failures/collapse
of the formal system. Informal seed systems are,
however, geared to different needs and so have
different products (OPVs, small grains, etc.).
Farmers need research support and links with
private sector for multiplication.
This alternative narrative is promoted by a
diverse group of actors which include farmers
themselves, farmer organisations, NGOs and
some institutional analysts especially those who
emphasise market access and how people gain
access to seeds. This group holds different
positions to those having an alternative view
about agricultural diversification, food security
and non-maize pathways and agrees that there is
need to mobilise from grass roots and strengthen
local seed systems. It recognises particular needs
and priorities of the informal systems, including
the importance of recognition and inclusion in
policy and programme design, the need for
extending breeding/crop management and
extension foci, and the requirement for
improvement in both yield and productivity of
traditional land races/varieties (offsetting the
degeneration caused by regular reuse without
active selection).
The NGO International Relief and Development
(IRD), for example, indicated that up to 60 per
cent of seed supply in their areas of operation
comes through informal systems. A recent seed
assessment supports this view, thus confirming
that the informal sector is both resilient and
dynamic with a surprising abundance of seed
(Sperling et al. 2009). Participatory variety
selection, on-farm trials, cross-border trade and
seed fairs have helped to keep the informal sector
lively and with an injection of new varieties. The
assessment also found that social networks of
exchange remain strong functioning throughout
the season, providing 10–38 per cent of the seed
sown to maize, groundnut, finger millet, cowpea,
sorghum, pearl millet and bambara nut.
6 The politics of seed policy
A number of competing narratives therefore co-
exist in Zimbabwe’s current policy debate, each
suggesting different routes to rebuilding the seed
system. While a dominant version is promoted by
both government and (many) donors/NGOs,
despite their often extreme political differences,
this is countered by two alternative perspectives.
The alternatives highlight the need to rebuild the
private sector with all its ancillary structures for
input distribution and the importance of
agricultural diversification, non-maize pathways
and the need to build from grassroots.
A variety of contradictions result from the
various pressures at play which, depending on
circumstances, can be commercial, where the
aim is to sell seed in bulk through guaranteed
contracts with government/donors; strategic
where the intention is to find some quick fixes to
food security problem and political when the aim
is to secure patronage via input schemes. The
current policy process centred on rebuilding
Zimbabwe’s seed system and agricultural sector
more generally is not just a technical-economic
debate but an intensely political process, driven
by particular actors and networks associated with
different interests.
Why is it then that a dominant narrative
involving seed relief prevails, and alternatives
are silenced or ignored? A number of themes can
be identified.
Political instability and short-term planning. The
economic fundamentals (including credit supply,
collateral security, financing, investor confidence,
tenure security) had been substantially
undermined in the last decade. This makes
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rebuilding the seed system, with the private
sector at its core, very difficult – a relief
orientation is easier to achieve. Uncertainty in
the political setting is undermining the ability to
plan for the future. Currently, planning time
horizons are short, and visions of the long term
are very difficult to define, given the lack of
clarity, and rapid change, in the broader political
economy of Zimbabwe.
Influence of patronage politics. Government/donor/
NGO-controlled delivery allows control and
patronage (our seed, our people), buying
allegiance through ‘development’. The UN,
donors, NGOs and government – often in
separate, parallel programmes – are using an
argument of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ to promote
programmes of seed delivery. Some see these as
simply ‘seed dumping’ and not addressing a
fundamental lack of supply. This fuels
patronage, as certain individuals/organisations
have an interest in promoting a ‘perpetual
emergency’ which justifies funding flows and
field activities. Others, formally working in the
policy realm, may have commercial interests in
the seed sector and may directly profit from the
activities being promoted. There is ‘profit to be
made from a crisis’.
A focus on techno-fixes. Presenting the problem as a
gap in seed supply suggests that solving the food
security/production problem is a technical
challenge which can be fixed by distributing
more seed and producing more food. This is a
typical Green Revolution-type approach, which
puts it as a simple technical challenge, not a
complex political economic one. This provides a
quick solution which does not look at the whole
system or ascertain the long-term social, political
and institutional changes that are required.
Limited regulatory capacity. The basic capacity to
oversee the provisions of the Seed Act and other
legislative provisions is weak. While this may not
be the result of deficiencies in the formal legal
framework which is well developed in Zimbabwe,
regulatory failures do exist. These undermine
the ability of the seed system to develop
effectively, especially in ‘emergency’ situations or
where seed is part of a political programme.
Under these circumstances, poor quality seed
may be provided, and a range of side-marketing
and other notionally illegal activities may be
promoted.
Restricted policy debate. Farmers, private sector and
other actors are not part of the current policy
debate. They are not within the mainstream
donor and government structures. Farmers lack
capacity to express ideas and perspectives in
policy arenas. This then eliminates them from
the policy processes. But also, there is a general
lack of debate about policy in Zimbabwe, with lots
of parallel policies being created behind closed
doors or the various corridors of power. This lack
of coordination, lack of trust and intense
politicisation of policy debate in Zimbabwe causes
problems.
7 The consequences of seed policy
The politics of these policy processes in turn
have a number of consequences, as discussed
below:
Constraints on agro-dealers. Instances of agro-
dealers closing down or being unable to operate
at certain times of the year when
government/donor/NGO programmes start
running were cited in interviews as well as
meetings.6 Overall, there has been a reduction in
the numbers of agro-dealers in the country from
around 2,800 in the late-1990s to around 300
registered dealers today, mostly concentrated in
the large chains/stores and in more urban
settings. With new market-oriented programmes
from 2010, this has improved, but distortions still
exist, and the focus on wholesaler support
concentrates power in the market.
Dependence on public and donor subsidies. Reliance on
the ‘fat cheques’ from government/donors/NGOs
is an increasing necessity for the private sector.
With their supply/delivery system decimated by
the consequences of the economic collapse since
1997, a business model focused on emergency
aid/government programmes has become a
commercial necessity. This results in a shift away
from building a long-term business strategy for
rebuilding agro-dealer networks and a move to
products which can be supplied as part of bulk
orders rather than a more differentiated,
customer-focused product development strategy.
Again, this may be changing from 2010, as seed
supply increases, and reliance on aid contract
declines, but such centralised efforts continue to
distort the industry’s priorities.
Rise of rent-seeking and elite capture. Large
programmes, involving big contracts and a highly
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diffuse and poorly-regulated distribution system,
open up many opportunities for corruption, rent-
seeking and speculation; examples are hoarding
and release of sub-standard products when prices
peaked. The involvement of senior officials, often
linked to the new farming-business-political elite,
was identified as part of the problem. Aid agencies,
NGOs and others are also not immune to corrupt
practices in field level delivery. The capture of seed
delivery by elites at the local level has been almost
inevitable, with certain local officials, traditional
leaders and others in charge of ‘targeting’.
Ill-conceived humanitarian aid. Much evidence
points to the very real demand for quality seed,
even in the cash-constrained markets of
Zimbabwe. People are certainly willing to pay,
and many more than assumed are able to pay for
high quality, improved seed. While there are
undoubtedly some who are clearly too poor to
afford inputs of this sort and therefore are
rightly the beneficiaries of aid/humanitarian
efforts, a narrow focus on seed and fertiliser may
not be the most appropriate form of social
protection for such people, given the agronomic
and financial risks involved. Linking such
benefits to conditionalities, such as conservation
farming, adds further distortions at the local
level, and much diversion of effort and energy.
Market and political distortions. Large-scale
government/aid programmes act to distort
markets, removing the competitiveness of local
seed sellers/agro-dealers. Large programmes by
their very nature are often poor at targeting, so
there is often a flood of supply in certain areas
(favoured government or NGO sites/villages/
districts – for political and other reasons), often
affected more by politics than demand, and an
absence of supply nearby. While secondary
markets emerge, these may not result in an
efficient distribution of supply. A donor focus on
communal areas and a government focus on new
resettlement areas are also creating geographical
(and so political) distortions. While market-
friendly mechanisms are being experimented
with, these often create their own distortions.
In sum, although there is merit in the
government and aid agencies implementing
market-based programmes to facilitate the
revitalisation of the agricultural input supply
chain, overlapping objectives, limited
coordination and mistrust among key
stakeholders is severely compromising the
effectiveness of the input programmes.
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Notes
1 Seed Security Assessment for Zimbabwe (2009).
2 Seed situation as at 8 December 2010, a
report produced by the Zimbabwe Seed
Traders Association.
3 Data was collected by Agritex as part of the
1st Round Crop Assessment (2011).
4 According to an evaluation by Concern World
Wide.
5 According to information compiled by Help
Germany.
6 Meeting discussions at a National Seed
Stakeholders Meeting held in Harare on
4 February 2010.
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